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Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition,
and Market Information Efficiency
By ROBERT E. VERRECCHIA*
In an attempt to provide a precise analytical interpretation for the notion of "information efficiency" introduced by Eugene
Fama (1970), Mark Rubinstein suggests that
a necessary and sufficient condition for an
individual to perceive all his information
fully reflected in prices is that he have "consensus beliefs." That is, consensus beliefs
are those beliefs which, if held by all individuals in an otherwise similar economy,
would generate the same equilibrium prices
as in the actual heterogeneous economy.
However, the notion of information efficiency embodied in Rubinstein's discussion has been more broadly interpreted as

If the set of information A happens to be
the union of the information sets privately

available to each and every market participant, then efficiency with respect to A
can be characterized as a situation in which
the consensus belief is at least as correct an
assessment (on the basis of A) as the assessment privately held by any single investor.
Stated more informally, all investors perceive that no less information is fully reflected in prices than that which each individual investor privately knows. With regard
to welfare implications, when the consensus
belief is at least as correct, investors face a
type of fair game in the market. That is, let
"excess returns" be defined as the difference
in the expected utility some well-informed
investor achieves by trading at a price which
reflects information inferior to his own visa-vis the expected utility he achieves when
price reflects information at least as good.
Then a price reflecting no less information
than what is privately known prohibits excess returns. In effect, prices provide an
effective barrier to the exploitation of less
well-informed investors by better-informed
investors, because no investor can exploit
his superior information (in the classical
price - taking setting usually attributed

follows.' A market is efficient with respect
to an information set A, say, if the prices it
generates are identical to those generated in
an otherwise identical economy in which the
set A accurately describes the information
available to each and every market participant; the common, or homogeneous, belief induced by knowledge of A is the consensus belief.2

*Graduate School of Business, University of
Chicago.
1See, for example, Avraham Beja, William Beaver,
and my 1979b paper.

2For example, suppose that a market consisted of

to a securities market) whenever a price
exists which reflects information which is in

two investors, the first of whom had as his sole source
of information a set 0, say, which contained only
optimistic bits and pieces of data about a security, and
which consequently induced him to regard the future
return of the security as "abnormally high." Alternatively, the second investor had as his sole source of
information a set P, say, which contained only pessimistic bits and pieces of data about the security, and

no way inferior to his own.3

original private sources, 0 and P, respectively, and if
this knowledge induces them to regard the future return of the security as average, then this will likely
cause no price change since prices have already averaged out their diverse opinions. Thus the market for the
security will be efficient with respect to A, where A is
the union of 0 and P.
3To illustrate this, consider the situation described
in fn. 2 in which one investor knows 0, and another
knows P. Suppose that a third investor enters the

which consequently induced him to regard the future
return of the security as "abnormally low." Suppose
further that trading against one another in the market
resulted in a price that appeared to reflect the fact that
the future return for the security would be "average";

this is a natural supposition if both traders have equal
weight in the market with regard to the supply and
demand of the security. Now if in an otherwise identi-

market who happens to know A, the union of 0 and P.

Clearly, the third investor is "better informed" than
either of the other two, where it will be assumed

cal market the set of information A, where A is the
union of 0 and P, is substituted for both traders'
874
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In brief, the consensus belief concept is
nature will draw from an urn a numbered
an intuitively plausible definition of market
ball that represents the return on the securinformation efficiency which, unlike some
ity. For the benefit of this discussion, it will
of its competitors, lends itself to formal
be assumed that numbers on the balls are
analyses. The purpose of this paper is to
normally distributed in the urn with known
consider its robustness. For example, it is
variance and unknown mean. Before tradwell known that prices are determined in
ing occurs, however, investors can draw
part by a type of geometric averaging of
sample observations from this urn; the
each investor's assessment weighted by his
observations are private information sets,
tolerance for risk. Therefore, efficiency with and A can represent the union of these sets.
respect to the union of investors' private
With his private observations, each investor
information sets can be loosely described as
forms an estimate of the unknown mean
a phenomenon in which the consensus belief
which, in turn, determines his individual
assessment. Then the consensus belief is at
implied by this geometric average is at least
least as accurate as any single investor's
as correct as any assessment that contribassessment whenever the precision (where
utes to the average. But there is no intrinsic
reason why this should be the case: if two
precision is defined to be the inverse of the
bettors have an opinion as to which horse
variance) of the estimate of the return imwill win a race, and one bettor's opinion is
plicit in the consensus belief is greater than
vastly superior to the other's (because of the
or equal to the precision in any single investime and expense invested in formulating
tor's estimate. This, in turn, implies that the
that opinion), there may be no averaging of
market is efficient with respect to A, the
their opinions that will be superior to that of
union of investors' information sets.
the more sagacious bettor.
The subsequent analysis considers the beThis is the problem. If one investor is
havior of investors with different tolerances
for risk in this situation. What is demonmotivated to invest in the acquisition of
information, it is within reason that he could
strated is that whenever all investors acquire
achieve an assessment that is more accurate
what each perceives to be an optimal quantum of information (in the form of sample
than that implied by the consensus belief,
observations), the degree of precision imdespite the fact that his assessment is among
plicit in the consensus belief is indeed no
those that are impounded in price. To
less than the degree of precision in a single
achieve a better understanding of this problem, it can be modeled along the following
investor's estimate. This result implies that
lines. Suppose that the mental process of
the Fama-Rubinstein insight as to what condetermining an assessment of the return of a
stitutes information efficiency is robust in
security is thought of as analogous to the
that it evolves naturally from the behavior
statistical process of determining an estiof investors operating in their own selfinterests. The fact that it is robust suggests
mate of some unknown parameter. That is,
suppose that at the end of a future period,
that it may provide a more viable and interesting characterization than competing theories.4 The following analysis formally demonstrates this result.
without controversy that possession of more information signifies being better informed. The only way
investors interact in a market is through prices; i.e., an
equilibrium price is established for a security on the
basis of investors' expectations, and at this price investors exchange holdings of the security. Therefore, when
the price the third investor encounters is the same price
that would prevail if each and every investor knew A,

and in our previous example this was the case, there is
no way he (the third investor) can earn an excess return

(as I have narrowly defined the term) on the basis of A,
despite the fact that it represents information superior

to that available to the two other investors.

4The chief competing theory is one of "rational
expectations." A recent survey article by Sanford
Grossman provides a comprehensive guide to this work.
The theory of rational expectations provides a particularly elegant argument for what constitutes market
information efficiency. However it is also fragile in that
it relies on a number of assumptions, such as the

absence of "noise" (i.e., indiscernable randomness),
which may not be met in a situation embodying the full
complexity of a real world setting. Furthermore, it is a
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I. A Description of the Market

To initiate the analysis, consider an inves-

conditional on the observed sample values
xl,..., x, an investor regards the distribution of R to be normal with mean

tor i who trades in a market which offers
the opportunity to purchase an unlimited
amount of a risk-free security denoted by
SF, or a risky security denoted by SR, whose
total supply is SR. At the end of some future
period, investment in the risk-free security
yields a fixed return of F units of wealth for
each unit of SF purchased, and investment
in the risky security yields an uncertain return of R units of wealth for each unit of SR
purchased. At the beginning of a trading
period, investor i will choose an amount SF
and S' of the risk-free and risky security,
respectively, which maximizes his expected
utility subject to his initial wealth, which is

denoted by W'. That is, investor i chooses
an amount SF and SR of the risk-free and

risky security, respectively, to maximize his
utility when SF and SR yield their respective

A h~i~i+ nhm

m=.

h

and precision h = h+ nh
n

where m= k
k= n
is the observed mean of the sample. It will
also be assumed that each investor's observations are distributed independently of
the observations of any other investor.
The sample mean itself, however, is not
known until the information has been
processed; prior to its revelation, it is a

to be the inverse of the variance - 1).6 The

random variable. Its unconditional distribution can be determined as follows. Conditional upon knowledge of R, m is normally
distributed with mean R and precision nh,
because it is the mean of n sample observations, each of which is normally distributed
about R with mean h. An investor's initial
or prior belief about R is that it is normally distributed with mean mi and precision h.
Thus, it can be shown that the unconditional distribution of m is a normal probability distribution with mean imi and preci-

acquisition of additional information is
characterized as a sample of a predetermined size n consisting of the observation

sion nhh/h.7
It will also be assumed that investor i has
a (negative) exponential utility function of

returns.

Before trading, an investor also has the
opportunity to acquire information. The
information acquisition process will be characterized as a sampling process from a normal probability distribution.5 That is, suppose that R is assumed to be some real
number which is initially known to all investors to be normally distributed with mean mii
and precision h (where precision is defined

of random variables X1,..., Xn, about which

it is known initially that each is independently and identically distributed normally
with mean R and precision h. Then it is well
known (see Morris DeGroot, p. 167) that

notion of efficiency which is stronger than that suggested by Fama (1976), or implied by the empirical
evidence concerning the existence of efficiency in the
semistrong form.
3This characterization of information acquisition is
suggested by Robert Wilson, p. 191.

7This result can be explained, intuitively, by noting
that mi is simply the mean of the prior distribution of

R, and nhh/) is equal to
nhh [h+nh ]=[I+l]'

h L nhh | Lnh h
That is, the precision nhh/h is simply the inverse of the

sum of the variance (nh)- I of the conditional distribution of the sample mean for any given value of R, and

6It should be emphasized that while prior assess-

the variance h-I of the prior distribution of R. In

ments are identical, it is assumed that each investor

effect, m is normally distributed with the mean investors attribute to R before they process the information,

arrives at the assessment mI independent of other investors. This allows these prior assessments to be treated
as though they were independent sample observations
about R, each with precision h.

mii, and precision which, in a broad sense, represents
the precision of their prior beliefs plus the precision of
the information itself.
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the form

n, SF, SR that

Ui( w) =rie- (11r,)w
(1) max |rie- el/r{FSF+RSR)
{n, SF, SRm R

for wealth w, where ri>O. The coefficient
1/ri is investor i's coefficient *of
risk
dN(m
m, h')averdN(iim, nhk-lh )
sion; its inverse ri is referred to as his coeffisubject to Wi = SF + PSR + C(n), where
dN(,u, p) denotes a normal density function

cient of risk tolerance. The purpose in assuming utility functions of this form is that
it permits a consensus belief to be explicitly
determined.8 The extent to which the results
of the analysis depend upon this assumption
is not entirely clear. However, as the discussion unfolds, it becomes clear that the salient feature of the analysis is the relationship
between degrees of risk tolerance and information acquisition activities; therefore, it is
reasonable to conjecture that the form of
the utility function assumes no more than a
secondary role, provided that it evidences
global risk aversion.9
When investor i enters the market at the
beginning of the period, he encounters the
following problem. If the cost associated
with making n sample observations is represented by a function C(n) (which is assumed to be a twice differentiable function

with mean ft and precision p.

For example, consider optimal amounts

of SF and SR' conditional upon the choice of
n sample observations. Conditional upon n,
(1) reduces to solving the Lagrangian equation

L(SF, SR, X)=-f 4el/ri{FSF+RSR)dN( mh)
+X{ W'- (SF+ PSR + C(n))}
Differentiating L with respect to SR yields
(2)

aL J Re l/ri{FSF+RSR)dN(, h )-XP

of n), investor i must choose

1) an optimal number of sample observations, and
2) based upon the information in those
observations, as well as his prior informa-

Differentiating L with respect to SF yields

-a Fe lri{FSF+RSR)dN(m )

tion, an optimal amount SR' and SF of risky
and risk-free securities, respectively, so as to
maximize his future period expected utility;
and, of course, his choices must be constrained by his initial wealth.
Suppose that a unit of the risk-free and
risky security sell in the market for 1 and P
units of wealth, respectively (i.e., the price
of a risk-free security is a numeraire). Investor i's choice problem can be characterized
mathematically as choosing those elements

8The existence of a consensus belief, however, can

Necessary first - order conditions require
aL/aSR= aL/aSF= 0 in (2) and (3). Thus
the two equations can be combined to yield
Re-1/ri{FSF+RSR) dN( h, )

(4) p=Fe- F1/ri{FSF+RSR) dN( mh)

Recognizing that for any parameter a,

be established even in the absence of an explicit determination. See my 1979b paper.

9 Note that the assumption of constant risk tolerance implies that an investor's tolerance for risk is
independent of his wealth. However, if one postulates
that risk tolerance increases as wealth increases, investors with large constant risk tolerance can be thought
to assume the role of investors with large wealth.

-aR dN(i, v) = e-a+a2/2vdN(,u- v)
and using a common property of the moment generating function of a normal dis-
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tribution, it can be shown that (4) reduces to

security SR, assuming that the price of the
risk-free security is set at one.

(5)
II. Consensus Beliefs and Market

JRdN ( R,T h

Information Efficiency

ri h / m-(SR/rlh)
F

dN(

^

S

F

Rearranging terms yields the amount of the
risky security investor i demands,

(6) S=rIhrm {-FP}
Suppose it is assumed, however, that
investor i is representative of all other
investors in the market; specifically, each

To provide some intuition, the expression
for P in (8) can be interpreted as the ratio of
1) the sum of each investor's assessment or estimate of the unknown mean of
the return for R, m6, weighted by the coeffi-

cient rihi/vo, and adjusted by a factor of
supply represented by - ST/vO, to
2) the known fixed return of the risk-

free security F.

Using the definition of a consensus belief
(see Rubinstein or my 1979b paper), it is a
simple exercise to show that the expression

investor j, say, has a utility for wealth char-

acterized by a constant tolerance for risk rj

and an assessment of the distribution of R

which is normal with mean mj and precision
h =h+njh (where n. is investorj's optimal

number of sample observations). Then summing (6) over the demand of all investors
yields
N

(7) h r1h1m -v0FP
i= 1

where N is the total number of investors,
N

i= 1

is a consensus belief. This is because this
expression is precisely that belief, or estimate, of the unknown mean of R, which, if
held by all investors in some otherwise identical market, would effect a market-clearing
price identical to the one derived in (8).1o
Consider the variance of the consensus
belief. Assuming that each sample observation made by an investor is independent of
all other observations made by all other
investors, as well as those other observations
made by himself, the variance of the consensus belief is

is the sum of the precision in each investor's
assessment of the unknown mean weighted
by his risk tolerance, and
N

(9)

Var[ i E Vo Var

SRE SR
i= 1

= E ( v)2h

represents the total supply of risky securities. Finally (7) implies

=
E r;
N
2 hi

(8) F I z ( SR
The expression derived in (8) is the marketclearing or equilibrium price of the risky

'0Specifically, it can be shown that if each inves
regarods the distribution of R to be normal with

I(r,h1/vO)mi' and precision vo/(Iri), a price ide

to the one in equation (8) obtains.

This content downloaded from 165.123.108.195 on Tue, 18 Oct 2016 17:59:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 70 NO. S VERRECCHIA: CONSENSUS BELIEFS 879

remembering that the
ri ofhi
constant.1
a number
steps.are
First, a all
function
H(r) is

As discussed heuristically in the introduction, the notion of market information
efficiency that underlies the concept of a
consensus belief is that the variance in the
consensus belief assessment of uncertainty
(in this case the un-known mean of R) is less
than or equal to the variance in each inves-

tor's personal assessment. (This, of course,
implies that the precision in the consensus
belief is at least as great as the precision in
each investor's assessment.) Since the variance of the consensus belief assessment is
given by (9), and the variance of each inves-

introduced to represent an investor's optimal degree of precision as a function of his
tolerance for risk through the relationship

H(r) =h =h+no(r)h
where no(r) represents the optimal number
of sample observations an investor requires
as a function of his risk tolerance. Second,
in this section, it is demonstrated that a
sufficient condition that equation (10) hold
is that H(r) is a nondecreasing function of

tor's assessment is given by hJ 1, this can ber; that is, each investor's optimal degree of

expressed formally as the requirement that

precision is a nondecreasing function of his

for each investor j, j = 1,..., N,

risk tolerance. Finally, the fact that H(r) is
indeed a nondecreasing function of r is

(10) E hiN(h)

demonstrated in the next section.
If it is assumed that H(r) is nondecreasing, proving the validity of equation (10) is

The interesting question is under what
circumstances the expression in (10) would
hold. Casual observation of (10) suggests
that if investors with large risk tolerance
have little precision in their assessments,
and vice versa, then the variance in the

consensus belief will be large, because in
effect poor assessments are given greater
weight in determining the consensus belief
than good assessments. Therefore, for (10)
to hold, it must be that investors with greater
risk tolerance somehow contribute better
assessments to determining the marketclearing price than investors with lower risk
tolerance. The next section considers how
investors choose an optimal degree of precision on the basis of their risk tolerance, and
suggests a circumstance in which the appropriate behavior results.

straightforward. To begin, consider the investor whose risk tolerance is no less than
the risk tolerance of any investor in the
market; this investor is referred to as in-

vestor k. That is, rk > ri for all i. This implies
that for all i,
N

riH(rk) < rkH(rk) < r, rH( ri)-=_vo
i=lI

which in turn implies that for all i,
V0

(11) H(rk)<?
However, for equation (10) to be valid for
investor k, it must be that

N ri2H(ri)

,a 2/f( < { H(rk)}-

III. A Sufficient Condition to Ensure

Information Efficiency

The characterization of market efficiency
implied by the consensus belief interpretation requires that equation (10) hold. The
validity of equation (10) is demonstrated in

i-I VO

or

N r-2H(ri)H(rk)

(12) y
i=l

ei

" This also requires that each investor's prior assessment of the mean of R, imI is arrived at independent of
other investors. See fn. 6.

Substituting the inequality in (11) into the
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that is, an investor's optimal number of
sample observations is a nondecreasing

left-hand side of (12) yields

r12H(ri)H(rk ) ri2H(ri) vo
Ea 2 <AL 2

i=l

vO

i=I

vo

ri

N ri H(ri)
i=lIt

which implies (12). Thus, the degree of precision in investor k 's assessment is no greater
than the degree of precision in the consensus belief assessment.
But note that if H(r) is a nondecreasing
function of r, then it must be that for all

function of his risk tolerance. Since the optimal degree of precision is a linear function
of the optimal sample size, this implies that
the optimal degree of precision is a nondecreasing function as well.

To show that no(r) is a nondecreasing

function of r, an expression for equation (1)
is needed. Recall that since it was shown

that SR= ri h{tm-FP} and SF= W'-C(n )-

PSRJ are optimal amounts of the risky and
risk-free security, respectively, (1) can be
expressed as
max G(n, r)

i, H(rk)> H(ri). That is, investor k attains a
degree of precision that is no less than the
degree attained by anyone else in the market.
Consequently, no one else in the market has
a degree of precision which is greater than
the degree of precision in the consensus

{n}

subject to W= SF+ PSR+ C(n)

where G(n, r)

belief assessment, which ensures equation
(10). In brief, market information efficiency
holds in the sense of (10) whenever each
investor attains as an optimal degree of precision a level which is a nondecreasing function of his risk tolerance.
It remains to show that H(r) is a nondecreasing function. However, even in the ab-

sence of the analysis performed below, one
would intuitively expect this to be the case.
This is because investors with greater risk
tolerance invest a greater proportion of their
wealth in the risky security relative to investors with the same wealth and the same
values for mean and precision, but with
lower tolerances for risk. For example, this
relationship can be seen from the expression
for investor demand derived in (6):

SR = rih1 {imi - FP)
Therefore to safeguard their increased
amount of investment in the risky security,
one might reasonably expect risk tolerant
investors to acquire more information. This
is shown in the next section.
IV. Optimal Sampling Sizes

L | re-F/r{W-C(n))-h{R-FP){?-FP)

X dN(rm, hi) dN(iim, nhI/h )
and the i sub- and superscripts used to identify investor i are also dropped to ease the
notational burden. That is, G(n, r) is the
expected utility an investor with risk tolerance r achieves when he chooses to make n
sample observations.
Using the properties of a normal moment
generating function discussed above, integration with respect to R yields
(13)

G(n, r)=f _re-F/r{W-C(n)I-2h{P-FP)2
m

x dN(fim, nhi/h )
As a means of integrating the expression in
(13), let the variable y be introduced, where
y is defined as

y = (nh/i/h)'12{m-m}

In this section it is formally demonstrated

that no(r) is a nondecreasing function of r; which implies dy= (nhK/)'lh dm
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Also note that a priori an investor does
not know what value P will assume. It will

for each value of r. The function no(r)

have as if he believes that price will simply

represents the optimal number of sample
observations an investor should acquire
when his risk tolerance is r. It is necessary

reflect the ratio of what all investors know

to show that no(r) is a nondecreasing func-

be assumed here that each investor will be-

initially about the expected return for R,
i.e., mi, to the risk-free return F; that is, all
investors will behave as if they believe that

P=mii/F. Stated differently, investors act as
if prices reflect only what is already well
known, and not (among other things) their
own additional information acquisition activities, or the information acquisition activities of others.'2 This assumption is consistent with the notion that as price takers in
a traditional market setting, investors behave as if they perceive no relationship between their own activities and price. Analytically, this assumption implies (with some

tion of r. This is done using the above
expression for G(n, r).
Allowing the derivative with respect to n
to be denoted by an asterisk, observe that

G*(n,r)= {C*(n)- h(nh+h )
x G(n, r)
since

a ov Whl/2- _(h)1/2h( h+)3/2

algebraic manipulation) that

=2 h(nh+h) lh/h)/

h {m-FP}2= {(nh)2/h} {m-m }2

= {nh/h}y2
where the variable y is used as a substitution.
It can be shown that a further substitution of y in place of the variable m transforms (13) into

Assuming that C(n) is a strictly increasing
function of n, a necessary first-order condi-

tion for maximization requires that no(r)

satisfy

(14) C*(no(r))= rh

2F(no(r)h + )

since in this case G* =0. Furthermore,

G(n, r)

(15) G**(n,r)

fy |-re'/'{~'FW-C(n))- 1/2(1 +(nh/h))ly

=F C**(n)+ Ih2(nh+h)2} G(n, r

which, when integrated using properties of a
normal probability distribution, yields

G(n, r)= -r(h-lh^) /e-/{-(
With an expression for G(n, r) now avail-

+ (FC*(n) -'Ih(nh+hF }G(n, r
Therefore, a sufficient second-order condi-

tion for maximization is that for all n,

able, define a function no(r) which repre-

sents the value of n which maximizes G(n, r)

(16) r C**(n) + 2 h (nh+h)>o

12This assumption is incompatible with theories,
such as that of rational expectations, which rely substantially upon investors' ability to decode prices, or
infer the information acquired by others through prices,
over time (see Grossman). In effect, it suggests that
investors evidence somewhat myopic behavior. Its advantage is that it may describe what occurs in an actual
market setting.

since in this case G is a concave function.
(Concavity follows from the fact that G(n, r)
is negative for all n and r, and the expressions in (15) which precede those of G(n, r)
are both positive; thus G** is negative
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whenever (16) holds.) Of course, maximization also requires that there is sufficient
wealth for an investor to achieve this optimum, i.e.,

PSR+ C(nO(r)) < W
But this will also be assumed since we are
specifically concerned with the circumstance
in which each investor achieves his optimal
sample size.'3

But the numerator of (17) is clearly nonnegative because all its terms are; the denominator is positive under the assumption
ensuring concavity of G expressed in (16).
Therefore, n' is a positive function of r,

which implies that n0 is (at least) a nondecreasing function of r.

The fact that no(r) is nondecreasing im-

mediately implies that H(r) is also nondecreasing through the relationship

As an aside, note that while (16) does not
H'(r) = n'(r)h

require that the cost function is convex, for

all practical purposes it does since otherwise
a counterexample to the claim that G is
concave can likely be constructed by an
appropriate choice of parameters. This limitation notwithstanding, consider the objective of a cost function more generally. For
equation (10) to hold, the cost function must
prohibit a low-risk-tolerant investor from
attaining a greater degree of precision than
a high-risk-tolerant investor, or else the (geometric) average of their precisions may no
longer exceed the precision of the investor
with greatest precision. Increasing marginal
cost of increased sampling is one circumstance which achieves this.
Finally, we demonstrate that the behavior
of an optimal number of sample observations, as expressed in equation (14), is suffi-

In summary, if each investor can attain his
optimal precision by acquiring his optimal
number of sample observations, the degree
of precision will be a nondecreasing function of his risk tolerance. As discussed previously, this behavior is sufficient to ensure
that a market is informationally efficient in
that equation (10) holds.

V. Conclusion

The interesting elements of any characterization of information efficiency are
those conditions that are sufficient to induce
it. This analysis attempts to point out that
although there is no intrinsic reason why the
cient to imply that no(r) is a nondecreasing geometric averaging performed by prices
function of r. Assuming that no is differen- should yield an assessment (i.e., the consensus belief) which is no less precise than
tiable with respect to r, differentiating both
the individual assessments which contribute
sides of (14) yields (where differentiation
to the average, it holds whenever all inveswith respect to r is denoted by a prime):
tors acquire what each perceives to be an
C**(no) *nlO
optimal quantum of information in the presence of some common cost function. For
example, suppose that publicly available information is thought of as an urn from
which investors make sample observations
or, rearranging terms,
at some cost (in wealth, time, or effort).
h
Then, within the context of the notion of
market efficiency discussed here, a market
2 F( n0h+ i)
efficient with respect to all publicly available information would naturally result; sufficient conditions would require no more
2F(noh+h)
than that investors act in their own selfinterest. But, investors acting in their own
' Note that given the nature of each investor's
self-interest is an assumption common to
choice problem, the nonnegative amount W-PSRmost discussions of competitive markets.
C(n) which remains after n and SR are selected is
Therefore, this interpretation of market insimply that amount allocated to investment in the
formation efficiency may imply a phenomerisk-free security.

h 1 rhn' |

2F{(noh+h) (noh+h4 J

(17) n'O= h2
C**(no) + rh
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non that arises naturally from the market
process.

m= the mean of the distribution of R
posterior to acquiring additional
information

Of course, there are a number of assump-

tions made in this analysis that limit generalization. Most significantly, it is assumed
that investors face a common cost function
which, although not necessarily convex, may
approximate that requirement. A further restriction, but less obvious in its impact, is
the assumption that all investors have constant risk tolerance. Thus, it is easy to imagine situations in which efficiency within the
context of the consensus belief interpretation will not obtain. However, situations of
this nature may be useful for explaining
anomalies in the literature of efficient
markets. The point of this paper is to demonstrate that the consensus belief interpretation of market information efficiency is both
viable and robust.
APPENDIX

h=the precision of the distribution
of R posterior to acquiring additional information

ri= the risk tolerance of investor i
C(n) = the cost of sampling n observations

dN(I, p) =a normal density function with
mean ,u and precision p

vo=the value of the sum over all investors of the product rihi

n o(r) = the optimal number of sample
observations acquired by an investor with risk tolerance r

H(r) = the optimal degree of precision
attained by an investor with risk
tolerance r, i.e., H(r)=h+no(r)h
G(n, r)=the expected utility an investor
with risk tolerance r achieves
when he chooses n sample observations.

SF= the risk-free security

SR = the risky security
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